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This paper examines the construction equipment resale market to assess whether equipment produced
by the world's largest manufacturer of construction machinery, Caterpillar, experienced lower product
quality in facilities that underwent contract disputes during the 1990's.  Analysis of auction data reveals
that resale market participants significantly discounted machines produced in these dispute-affected
facilities.  Additionally, pieces of equipment produced in facilities undergoing unrest were resold more
often, received worse appraisal reports, and had lower list prices.  Taken together, the evidence supports
the hypothesis that workmanship at dispute-affected facilities declined, and that the resulting impact
on the economic quality of the equipment produced was significant.  The dispute was associated with
at least $400 million in lost service flows due to inferior quality equipment alone.
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amas@haas.berkeley.eduThe economic costs of industrial relations events such as strikes, slowdowns or work stoppages 
can be significant.  The evidence from firm-level measures of output and output per worker is strong on 
this point (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Katz et. al. 1983; Kleiner et. al. 2002).  Less is known about the 
effect of labor unrest on product quality, but there are reasons to believe that this relationship could be 
sizable.  Product quality is linked to effort, and the degree to which workers can reduce on-the-job effort
during a labor dispute depends on the firm’s ability to monitor employee performance, which can be 
limited.  For example, an equilibrium outcome of Shapiro-Stiglitz-style efficiency wage models is that the
more costly it is for the firm to monitor performance, the higher is the wage increase for a given increase 
in  effort.
1    At  face  value,  this  feature  implies that  when  firms demand  wage  concessions  from their 
workers, the resulting fall in productivity should be most pronounced when productivity is manifested in 
hard to observe ways.  When goods are complex, a dimension of productivity that is particularly hard for 
firms to measure is product quality.  It follows that even when workers are on the job, and the firm is 
operating at full capacity, employees may still be able to reduce the effort necessary for ensuring the 
quality of the product in manners that are practically undetectable.  Hence, the effect of a disruption in 
labor relations on the quality of production may be large, but it is an effect that is not easy to ascertain for 
the firm or, unfortunately, for the econometrician.  
In this paper, I propose a series of tests to determine whether a specific labor dispute affected 
productivity through the reduction in the quality of goods produced.  These tests are the result of a detailed 
analysis of the industrial relations climate within the firm and of the market in which these goods transact.  
Concretely, I study whether workers at Caterpillar, a manufacturer of construction equipment machinery, 
produced inferior equipment while working during an extended contract dispute in the 1990’s.  The tests 
rely on the proposition that shocks to quality will induce changes in the behavior of participants in resale 
markets.  While product quality is difficult to measure for an assembled piece of machinery, resale market 
participants had many years to learn about the equipment, and as a result, their actions reveal defects in the 
machines  that  the  manufacturer  may  not  have  been  able  to  detect  at  the  time  of  assembly.    This 
information is the econometrician’s advantage over the firm that I exploit.    
                                                
1  See Malcomson (1999) (and of course Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) for examples of Shapiro-Stiglitz-style efficiency 
wage models.    Hendricks and Kahn (1991) develop a model of efficiency wages in a union setting.     2
The event studied in this paper is a well-known confrontation that occurred between the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) and Caterpillar through the better part of the 1990’s.  The dispute, which began
when the UAW contract with Caterpillar expired in September 1991 and ended when the next contract 
was signed in early 1998, was long and contentious by most standards.  The dispute spanned two strikes, 
dozens of brief walkouts, the use of replacement workers, and threats to permanently replace the unionized 
workers.  Ultimately the conflict resulted in the National Labor Relations Board filing 443 complaints 
against Caterpillar, the most ever issued against one company (Cimini 1998).  
As indicated, in order to study the effect of the dispute on quality, an unobservable outcome, I 
assemble evidence from an analysis of the construction equipment resale market.  The dataset contains the 
resale price, reported condition and resale rate for more than 48,000 pieces of used construction equipment
sold at auction.  Using these data, I formulate tests of the hypothesis that equipment produced during the 
period of labor unrest was of reduced quality.  These tests are predicated on dynamic  models of the 
durable goods resale market that make predictions on prices and trading volume following quality shocks
(eg. Hendel and Lizzeri 1999, Porter and Sattler 1999).  In addition, reports on the physical condition of
the  equipment  on  the  resale  market  are  used  in  conjunction  with  prices  and  resale  rates  to  compile 
evidence on quality effects of labor unrest.  
Analysis of the resale auction data reveals that pieces of equipment produced by workers involved 
in the dispute were discounted by approximately 5% in the resale market, received lower quality ratings by 
independent appraisers, and experienced higher resale rates compared to equipment produced in other 
plants and other periods.  I estimate that the dispute was associated with at least $400 million in lost 
service flows from inferior quality equipment.  Because some of these costs were “hidden”, that is, not 
immediately  felt  by  the  firm  and  unknown  to  the  workers,  accounting  for  them helps  explain  the 
substantial  length  of  this  particular  labor  dispute  through  the  lens  of  a  war-of-attrition  model  of 
bargaining.  I find that, ultimately, the labor cost savings that Caterpillar obtained by breaking with the 
union (which I calculate) most likely exceeded these losses.      
The findings in this paper complement several other studies that provide evidence linking the 
industrial relations and workplace climate to measures of economic performance (eg. Katz et. al. 1983,
Freeman and Medoff 1984, Harter et. al. 2002, Kleiner et. al. 2002, Bartel et. al. 2003, Krueger and Mas 3
2004, and Mas 2006).  This paper is the first to use market outcomes to measure product quality.  The 
advantage of this approach is that it provides measures of employee performance that incorporate both 
contractible and non-contractible dimensions of effort.  The non-contractible dimensions of effort are 
interesting as they are precisely where a sharp change in working conditions should have the greatest 
impact.  By not considering them, one risks underestimating the productivity effects of disruptions in labor 
relations.    Using  market  outcomes also allows  one  to quantify  how  much  disputes  cost  firms  and 
consumers.  A final attractive feature of this analysis is that it is more general than a single-plant case 
study; since there are numerous production lines affected by the dispute, the paper identifies a general 
pattern in declining workmanship across many processes.  
II. Background of the Company and the Labor Dispute
Caterpillar  is  the  world’s  largest  manufacturer  of  construction,  mining,  agricultural,  forest 
machinery and other types of equipment.  In 1991, the company employed more than 53,000 workers 
worldwide, including about 38,670 in the United States, and had more than 33 manufacturing facilities 
around  the  world.    The  UAW  represents  workers  in  the  transportation  construction  equipment
manufacturing sector.  In 1991, the union represented about 15,100 Caterpillar employees at plants in 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Tennessee.  
The conflict originated as the parties attempted to negotiate a contract to replace the one expiring 
in September 1991.  The UAW sought to continue pattern bargaining, by which they would target a 
company in the industry for negotiations and pressure other companies to sign the same contract.  There 
were early signs that Caterpillar would demand concessions from the UAW.  Eckert (1992) reports that as 
early as October 1990 officials at the UAW local in Peoria “warned that a strike was possible and advised 
members to start fattening their bank accounts.”  By July 1991, it became evident that negotiations would 
be exceedingly difficult when the parties could not agree to a location for the contract talks [Cimini 1998].  
Negotiations  between  the  UAW  and  Caterpillar  broke  down  permanently  after  Caterpillar  refused  to 
accept the contract that the UAW had negotiated with John Deere in October 1991. 
In November 1991 the  UAW placed 2,400 members  on strike in  hopes of further pressuring 
Caterpillar.    Caterpillar  subsequently  locked  out  5,650  more  workers  and  laid-off  500  more.    In the 
following months, 8,050 workers were on the picket lines.  On April 1, 1992, Caterpillar sent letters to 4
striking workers telling them that unless they returned to work by April 6, they would “lose their place in a 
reduced workforce,” and “be replaced by a returning striker, an employee recalled from the layoff, or a 
permanent new hire.”
2  Facing the threat of replacement workers, and potentially a significant number of 
workers crossing the picket lines, the UAW called off their strike on April 14, 1992 but did not agree to 
sign a contract under Caterpillar’s terms.
The company’s attempt to permanently replace the striking workers seemed especially unfair to 
some workers.  Franklin (2001: p. 161) reports that “the gripes were not about the losses the union had 
suffered but the arrogance of the company to think it could [function] without the union’s help.”  One 
worker, Randy Morrell, said that “we were told all through the 1980s that we had to share ideas and 
benefits with the company…and here came 1991, and the whole thing was jerked out from under us...we 
are not going to reap the benefits.”
3  Over the next two years UAW members  at Caterpillar worked 
without a contract and sporadically participated in brief wildcat strikes.  Workers complained of daily 
harassment by management and arbitrary disciplining and there is evidence that workers reduced their 
effort on the job as a response.  In fact, a reduction of effort was official UAW policy as its leaders 
initiated a “work-to-rule” campaign in Caterpillar plants, in which workers follow orders precisely but 
take absolutely no initiative on the job (Cohen 2002). 
In the early years of the dispute, there were rumors that the quality of Caterpillar machines being 
produced was substandard.  The UAW cited a series of customer complaints that had been submitted to 
Caterpillar as evidence (Mining Week 1992) as well as an internal memo written by Aurora, Illinois plant 
manager Chuck Elwyn.  The memo, a copy of which was provided to a reporter for the Engineering News-
Record, states that quality objectives for July 1992 had been missed by a wide margin ranking as “the 
poorest performance in the plant’s history” and “the worst month by any plant in the entire corporation’s 
history.”
4  Several months later, The Economist reported that Caterpillar “customers and dealers are beset 
with rumors of a slide in productivity and product quality” (The Economist 1993).    
Another sign of the turmoil Caterpillar experienced during these years are the large number of
complaints filed with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) originating from unionized 
                                                
2  Quoted in Daily Labor Report (1992: p. A-4).  
3 Quoted in Franklin (2001: p. 165).
4 Quoted in Engineering News-Record (1992).5
Caterpillar plants.  Numerous OSHA complaints indicate a poor industrial climate, either because the 
employer creates conditions that adversely affect workers safety or because workers wish to pressure the 
employer for improved working conditions.  Figure 1 plots the number of complaints to OSHA from 1984 
to  2001  from  workers  at  Caterpillar  and  Deere,  Caterpillar’s  closest  American  competitor.    OSHA 
complaints originating from Caterpillar plants were stable through 1991, but increased by 225% in 1992, 
and then by an additional 92% in 1993.  By contrast, there is no perceptible increase in the number of 
complaints  originating  from  Deere  plants  over  the  dispute  period.    Figure  2  plots  the  percentage  of 
complaints that led to Department of Labor (DOL) violations at Caterpillar.  There is no apparent change 
in the percentage of complaints that led to DOL violations during the dispute period, suggesting that 
workers were not submitting frivolous complaints.
When new contract talks broke down in June of 1994, the UAW initiated another strike, this time 
with 13,000 workers.  This strike lasted until December 1995; during this period, Caterpillar staffed its 
plants with reassigned white-collar workers, full-time new hires, and temporary workers.  In addition, one-
third of the UAW workers crossed the picket lines.  Despite the strike, Caterpillar sales increased 23% in 
1994 and 11% in 1995, and earnings rose 46% in 1994 and 19% in 1995.  The second strike again ended 
without a contract for the UAW workers.  Finally, after six and a half years without a contract, in March 
1998 the UAW ratified a new six-year agreement with Caterpillar covering 13,000 Caterpillar employees. 
The conditions for the new contract were almost identical to the ones that Caterpillar had offered over the 
past six and one-half years.
5  
2.2 Construction equipment production
Although automation has an important role in the assembly of construction equipment, humans 
have substantial discretion over the quality of construction equipment produced.  Even with the use of 
flexible machine tools, which were introduced in Caterpillar plants during the early period of the dispute,
the production process was not fully automated owing, in part, to relatively short product cycles; the 
market for construction equipment is characterized by a vast amount of product differentiation — there are 
353 different Caterpillar models of equipment in the sample used in this paper.  According to Boiarsky 
                                                
5 The contract called for an immediate wage increase ranging from 2% to 4%, provided for three lump-sum payments 
of 3% of earnings in 1999, 2001, and 2003, and maintained COLA for all but entry-level employees.  The company 
also agreed to hire back 160 workers fired for strike-related activities6
(1994), “robots at Caterpillar did not prove to be much of a boon. In areas such as welding, robots could 
not do a satisfactory job. The welding done by humans was superior.”  There are many other important 
steps in the production process of construction equipment that require substantial human intervention.  For 
example, equipment is painted manually, which if not done adequately will result in premature rusting.  
Nuts and bolts must be applied to the equipment using the correct torque.  Too little torque will results in a 
bolt that does not hold the parts tightly and a bolt with too much torque can break during installation.  As a 
result, there is potential for workers to affect the quality of goods produced  
III. Discussion of the Data and the Evaluation Strategy
I assembled a dataset describing the characteristics of more than 48,000 pieces of equipment sold 
at auction between January 1994 and September 2002.  The underlying data are proprietary to Equipment 
Watch  (EW),  a  company  that  sends  agents  to  construction  equipment  auctions  to  report  on  the 
characteristics of equipment sold.  Aside from the last bid, agents record the type of equipment sold, 
model, model year, serial number, the location of the auction, the auctioneer, a brief description of the 
equipment sold, auction date, and appraise the condition of the machine on a six point scale, ranging from 
“poor” to “excellent”.
6  Contractors and leasing companies use these data to estimate the value of their
construction equipment.  
In addition to the auction transaction data, EW also provided a serial number guide that reports the 
shipment year, country of origin and model type for each piece of equipment produced.
7  I use serial 
numbers to construct tight bounds on the production year of the construction equipment, estimates for 
assembly line level production, age of the production line, and time the equipment spent in inventory.  In 
addition, identifiers embedded in the serial numbers of all equipment can be used to infer the production 
line it was manufactured in.  The algorithm used to construct these measures is described in Appendix A.           
Ideally, precise comparisons of equipment produced at plants affected by labor dispute to those 
that were not could be made using detailed identifiers for the year of production and plant of production 
for each piece of construction equipment.  Unfortunately, these data are proprietary.  In the absence of 
                                                
6 The appraisals were not available to bidders at the time of auction.  
7 About 6,000 pieces of equipment were discarded from the dataset because their serial number could not be matched 
to the serial number guide, possibly because the serial numbers were misrecorded. An additional 110 observations 
were excluded from the dataset because the equipment was new at the time of auction.  The resulting dataset contains 
48,043 transactions.  7
such data, the strategy in this paper is to use the serial number of the equipment to infer its country of 
origin.
8    Caterpillar  is  a  large  company,  production  is  multi-national,  and  many  identical  models  of 
equipment are produced in a variety of countries.  While data for union versus non-union US Caterpillar 
production is publicly unavailable, plant-level data from Harris InfoSource show that of plants established 
before  1991,  organized  plants  employed  15,100  manufacturing  workers  and  non-organized  plants 
employed only 2,250 in 1998.  Further evidence that most US production occurred in organized plants can 
be seen from OSHA inspection records.  Between 1984 and 2001 there were 142 complaints to OSHA 
from workers in unionized Caterpillar plants as opposed to only 10 from workers in unorganized plants.  
Additionally, equipment produced in non-unionized facilities in the United States may have contained 
parts that were manufactured in organized plants.  For example, the Caterpillar plant in Pontiac Michigan, 
which  is  unionized,  produced  engines  that  were  installed  in  other  plants.    Because  unionized  plants 
produced a large share of US-made equipment during the dispute, dispute-affected equipment is therefore 
defined as any piece of equipment produced in the US at the time of the dispute.  The comparison group 
consists of equipment produced abroad, primarily in Europe and Japan.   
Table 1 summarizes the auction market transactions data that will be used in the analysis.  The 
table shows descriptive statistics for US and foreign machines, for pre-dispute, dispute, and post-dispute 
vintages.    The  table  reveals  that  the  dispute-affected  and  comparison  groups  are  fairly  balanced; 
approximately 40% of the equipment in  my sample was produced in  the  US, and about  19% of the 
equipment was produced in the US during the dispute.
9  To compare, approximately 47% of all equipment 
produced during this  period originated from plants in  the  United States.  However, the  table reveals 
several important differences in US and foreign equipment: pieces of equipment produced in the United 
States sold for a higher price at auction, tended to be from older production-lines, and were more likely to 
be classified in very good or excellent condition, were produced in older production lines, and were more 
                                                
8 With a valid serial number, country of origin can be determined using the Equipment Watch serial number guide.  
While it is possible to identify the production line, using publicly available information there is no way to match the 
production line to a plant of origin.
9 Despite the fact that the data were collected from 1994 onwards, several years after the dispute had begun, much of 
the equipment in the sample was produced during the dispute.  About 43% of the equipment in the sample was 
produced before the dispute.  An implication of this sampling scheme is that any estimates of the dispute effect will 
be based on differences in outcomes for relatively older equipment.  8
likely to be sold at auction in the United States.  These differences are driven in large part by composition; 
the mix of models produced in the United States differs from the mix produced abroad.
IV.  Model of the Construction Equipment Resale Market
Because  quality  is  unobserved,  inference  must  be  based  on  observable  characteristics  of 
equipment, including prices and volume of trade.  Models of the construction equipment resale market can 
guide the analysis by generating testable predictions on the relative prices and resale rates for goods that 
experience accelerated physical depreciation.  The following rational expectations model is adapted from
the dynamic two durable goods economy with no asymmetric information outlined in Hendel and Lizzeri 
(1999).
10  The model links closely to the empirical exercise, generating predictions for the relationship 
between quality, resale prices, price depreciation, and volume of trade.  The model also sheds light on the 
implications of consumer heterogeneity in the empirical identification of a quality change.  
In the model, consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the valuation of quality.  In the 
context of the construction equipment market this kind of heterogeneity could arise in a number of ways, 
including productivity differences across buyers.
11  Consumers are infinitely lived and equipment life is 
two periods.  Consumers’ valuations are parameterized by  , and lie on the interval ] , [   .  In a given 
period, consumers with preference   enjoy utility   q  if they purchase a good of quality q.  Consumers 
can only hold one piece of equipment at a time and must decide what quality of equipment to consume for 
that period.  Consumers who sell their equipment incur a transaction cost, T.  
There are two kinds of equipment, US and foreign.  Every period there is an exogenous flow  u y   
of new US goods and  f y of new foreign goods into the market.   I will assume that quality is deterministic
and observed by all parties in the market  (I will discuss the case of random quality realizations and 
asymmetric information later).  New US and foreign equipment exhibit quality level v, while used US and 
foreign equipment have quality  u w and  f w  respectively.  The initial ordering of quality is assumed to 
satisfy f u w w v   .  This ordering implies that new US and foreign equipment are of the same quality, 
                                                
10 A similar model is outlined in Porter and Sattler (1999).  9
but that foreign equipment depreciates more rapidly than the US good.  The assumption that foreign 
equipment depreciates more rapidly than US equipment is posited to match the facts from the actual resale 
market.    In  the  empirical  portion  of  the  paper  I  show  that  in  narrowly  defined  resale  markets,  US 
equipment produced in non-dispute periods garners a premium.  The assumption that new US and foreign 
equipment are of the same quality can be justified on the basis of warranties and quality control.  If quality 
control is effective, defects should be mostly latent.  Warranties ensure that new defective machines can 
be repaired or replaced at minimal cost to the consumer.  After outlining the remainder of the model I will 
consider what happens to resale prices and resale rates of US equipment relative to foreign equipment 
following a decline in  u w — the quality of used US equipment.  
Let  to P  denote the price of a good produced in country o (US or foreign) in period   (1 or 2) of 
the  good’s  life.    Assuming the  buyers  engage  in  stationary  strategies,  consumers  have the  following 
options in this model, resulting in corresponding discounted utilities:
  Buy used foreign equipment each period:
(1) , ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1       f f P w V
  Buy used US equipment each period:
(2) , ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 2       u u P w V
  Buy new US equipment and keep it for two periods:
(3)   , ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
2
1 3         u u P w v V
  Buy new US equipment each period:
(4) , ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 4          u u P T P v V
  Buy new foreign equipment each period:
(5) . ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 5          f f P T P v V
12
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Studies have shown evidence of persistent productivity differences across firms, even within narrowly defined 
industries (see e.g. Baily, Hulten and Campbell 1992). 
12 The remaining alternative, buying new foreign equipment and keeping for two periods, is ruled out by Proposition 
8 of Hendel and Lizzeri (1999).  Through self-selection, buyers who wish to buy and keep new equipment always 
purchase US equipment.   10
Denote  yf   as the preference of the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing used foreign 
equipment each period and nothing at all;  yu   as the preference of the buyer who is on the margin of 
choice between buying used US and used foreign equipment each period;  cu   as the marginal consumer 
indifferent between buying used US equipment each period versus buying and keeping new US equipment
every two periods; and  n   as the consumer who is indifferent between buying and keeping new US 
equipment and buying new US or foreign equipment each period.  By standard self-selection arguments
described  in  Hendel and Lizzeri  (1999), n cu yu yf          and  the  following ICC’s  are  satisfied:
, 0 ) ( 1  yf V  ), ( ) ( 2 1 yu yu V V    ), ( ) ( 3 2 cu cu V V    ), ( ) ( 4 3 n n V V    and  ) ( ) ( 5 4   V V   for    .  
Additionally, the following market clearing conditions must be satisfied:
(6) ) F( ) F( yf yu f y     ,
(7) ) F( )) ( 5 . 0 F( yu n cu u y       ,
where F( ) is the CDF of  .  The incentive compatibility constraints (ICC’s), and the market clearing 
conditions, are sufficient to solve for the new and used prices of the equipment, as well as for the set of 
consumers that pursue each purchasing strategy.  
Suppose  that  there  is  a  quality-shock  during  the  dispute  resulting  in  a  used  US  quality  of 
u u w w   .  Then, the change in the price of used US equipment is:    
(8)   u u yu u u u w w P P P         2 2 2 ,
where  u P 2  is the price of used US equipment produced during the dispute.  The observed change in the 
US-foreign price differential can be interpreted as the change in service flow for the consumer who is on 
the margin of choice between buying used foreign equipment each period and buying used US equipment 
each period.  This change is lower than the change in service flow to the average consumer who purchases 
used US goods since  )] , ( | [ cu yu yu E         .
For purposes of identification, however, the problem is more complicated than simply allowing 
for a change in the quality of US equipment because the dispute could have also coincided with other 
changes in the market for construction equipment.  Market-level demand- and supply-shocks are two 11
possible  confounding  factors.    For  example,  suppose  that in  addition  to  a  quality  shock,  the  dispute 
coincides with a change in the distribution of the  ’s, whereby each consumer’s valuation of equipment 
changes proportionately by a factor   ( >0).  This change in the distribution of the  ’s could come
about from changes in the value of the outside option.  Following this demand shock, the consumer that is 
indifferent between used US and used foreign equipment will have a different valuation of equipment,
yu  , than in (8).  A second possible confounder has to do with supply.  I estimate that the dispute period 
was associated with about a 12% reduction in the quantity of equipment produced within US production
lines relative to foreign lines, possibly coming about from production cuts due to a lack of workers, or the 
UAW’s work-to-rule campaign.
13  Lower US supply may lead to a higher resale price of US equipment in 
spite of a quality-shock.  In terms of the model, suppose that during the dispute US production falls from 
u y  to  u y    ( u y > u y   ).  The consumer that is indifferent between purchasing used US and used foreign 
equipment then rises from  yu   to some value yu     ( yu  < yu    ).  
Both the supply- and demand-shock examples lead to the same expression for the change in the 
US price.  Using the notation from the supply-shock case, the change in US resale price becomes:     
(9)      f yf yf u f yu yu u u yu u w w w w w P ) ( 2                     .
14
For the purpose of evaluating the economic implications of the quality-shock, the quantity of interest is
  u u yu w w      , which can be interpreted as a change in service flows for the marginal consumer.  The term 
   u f yu yu w w       will be small provided that US and foreign equipment are initially close substitutes, 
that is, if u f w w   is small.  By contrast, the term  f yf yf w ) (       is potentially large and will hinder one’s
ability to isolate the change in service flows coming about from the quality shock.  
The possibility of market-level shocks coinciding with a change in US equipment quality is why it 
is important to consider the difference-in-difference in price, namely the change in the US-foreign price 
differential over time.  Again using the notation from the supply-shock example, computing the change in 
price for foreign equipment yields:
                                                
13 A description of the procedure used to estimate production is in Appendix A.
14 In the demand-shock example, the change in the price of US goods can then be written just as in (9), replacing yu      
with yu  .  12
f yf yf f f f w P P P ) ( 2 2 2            .
The difference-in-difference expression is then:
(10)      u f yu yu u u yu f u w w w w P P P                   2 2 2 .
Note that the term  f yf yf w ) (      has been differenced out from (10).  If initially US and foreign goods are 
perfect substitutes ( u f w w  ), demand- or supply-shocks will affect the price of both US and foreign 
equipment, but will not affect the gap between these prices.  Therefore, by comparing the change of US 
and foreign equipment one can isolate factors that only affected changes in demand for US equipment
within a market.  
If new US and foreign equipment are imperfect substitutes prior to the dispute, then the second 
term of (10) is non-zero and the difference-in-difference in resale price will capture a combination of the 
downward shift in US equipment prices due to lower quality, as well the effects of the market-shock, 
which  differentially  affects  the  price  of  US  and  foreign  equipment.    In  the  supply-shock  example, 
imperfect substitutability makes the identification of the price effect from negative quality changes due to 
the labor dispute more difficult to detect.  It is an open but testable question as to whether consumers 
perceived US and foreign equipment to be close substitutes within model and production year classes.  To 
determine this one can verify whether US equipment garnered a premium in the resale market relative to 
similar foreign-made equipment during the non-dispute period.  I will ultimately conclude that the term 
   u f yu yu w w       is likely small.  
A second prediction of the model is that the negative shock to US used equipment quality will 
decrease new prices, but accelerate price depreciation of US goods relative to foreign goods.  To see why, 
note that (5), and the ICC’s, imply that the rental price of US and foreign equipment are equal: 
(11) f f u u P P P P 2 1 2 1      . 
A change in the quality of US equipment will not affect condition (11).  Consequently, following the 
quality shock, consumers discount new US equipment relative to new foreign equipment such that the 
rental price of US equipment relative to foreign equipment is unaffected (both US and foreign rental prices 
decline).  The difference-in-difference in the price of new equipment is therefore:
(12)     2 1 1 1 1 1 P P P P P P f u f u           .13
Because the effect of a quality-shock on new prices is smaller than on resale prices, price depreciation of 
US goods will increase relative to that of foreign goods.  While the structure of the resale data does not 
permit for clean tests for whether price depreciation of US goods accelerated, I can use data on list prices 
to examine the dispute’s effect on prices in the new construction equipment market and compare this 
quantity with the resale market price effects.  The model’s prediction is that if there is a decline in used US 
equipment quality, list prices of US goods should decline relative to foreign goods, but these effects will 
be smaller than those seen in the resale market.    
As a third and final prediction, I consider the size of the resale market for US equipment following 
the quality-shock.  Defining  o VOT  as the volume of trade in the resale market for equipment produced in 
country o, and assuming that  ~U ] , [   , the model implies that:   
)) ( F ) ( F ( )) ( F ) ( F ( VOT VOT VOT yu cu yu cu f u               
(13)                    0 ) )( ( 2 / ) 1 (         u u u u w w w w T     ,
where  cu   and  yu   denote post-shock marginal consumers.
15  Under the maintained assumptions, the 
size of the resale market for US equipment will grow following the downward shock to US quality.     The 
change in the relative size of the US resale market only reflects the change in the US resale market since 
the volume of trade in foreign equipment is always 100%.  This feature of the model is validated by the 
empirical results which show that foreign goods are sold considerably more frequently at auction than 
comparable US goods, conditional on observable characteristics.  
Note that the assumption of deterministic and observable quality rules out adverse selection in the 
resale market.  An alternative approach is to allow second period quality to be random and unobserved by 
buyers, thus allowing for adverse selection.
16  In this scenario, consumers of new US equipment will keep 
a good with a sufficiently high quality realization.  The predictions for used prices following a quality 
shock will be the same in both the model already outlined.  However, as Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) note, 
the prediction on the volume of trade in the resale market will depend on the exact nature of quality 
realizations.  In the deterministic case already discussed, volume is predicted to rise.  In the alternative 
case, where a quality-shock is modeled as a mean preserving spread to the distribution of US equipment 
                                                
15 The uniform distribution is assumed for tractability.  Other distributions also give this result.  14
quality, adverse selection will lead to a smaller resale market in US equipment, as is standard in these
kinds of models.  Ultimately, the question is an empirical one: if prices and condition reports indicate that 
the  dispute-era  US  equipment  were  of  lower  quality,  examining  volume  of  trade  will  allow  one  to 
determine whether the quality shock resulted in adverse selection, or whether it was characterized by
general and observable depreciation.  
V.  Estimation
Equation (9) suggests that an estimate of 2 P  can be interpreted as the change in service flows of 
equipment produced in US plants during the dispute for the marginal consumer, with an additional term 
accounting for the effects of potential market-wide shocks on the relative price of US and foreign goods.  
The purpose of this section is to describe how I will estimate this quantity.    
The first step towards reconciling the model with the data is to recognize that the resale market for 
construction equipment is characterized by a large number of models and vintages, while the theoretical 
model is specified for a single market.  It is therefore necessary to make comparisons within narrowly 
defined classes of equipment that approximate a market.  I define a market (which I will also call a cohort) 
as equipment belonging to the same model-class, production year, and calendar year of auction.
17  For 
example, the set of 1992-era 690B Caterpillar wheel dozers which were sold at auction in 1997 constitutes 
one market.  The primary reason for making comparisons within markets is to adequately control for 
market-wide shocks.  For example, markets that are dominated by US-made equipment could experience 
higher  prices,  in  spite  of  a  potential  quality-shock,  because  of  relative  scarcity  of  dispute-era  US 
equipment.  Within markets, however, the price effects of a supply-shock will be less of a confounder 
because it affects the prices of both US and foreign goods.  
Because of substantial heterogeneity in price-levels across models, I will estimate the price models 
in logarithms.  By modeling the changes as proportional, I allow for a consumer’s willingness to pay to 
pay to avoid defective machines to be a function of the baseline cost of the machine.  This specification is 
sensible because there is an opportunity cost associated with the use of equipment; the capital invested in
equipment undergoing maintenance could be invested elsewhere.  By contrast, modeling changes in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Genesove (1993) finds only weak evidence of adverse selection in the wholesale used car market.    15
US-foreign price differential in levels would imply that customers are willing to pay a fixed amount to 
ensure that the equipment is not defective.
18
In order to visually display the time-path of the US-foreign price differential, I will first estimate a 
model where the US price premium is allowed to vary across production years:
(14) ic at i c ic h US                 ) ( ) Y( X ' lnp , 2000 1984    .
ln ic p denotes the log price in 2000 dollars of equipment i from cohort c (model × production year × 
auction year),  c   is a cohort fixed-effect, USi takes the value of 1 if equipment is produced in the US and 
0 otherwise, and  ) ( Y  takes the value of 1 if the equipment is produced in year   and 0 otherwise.  The 
vector of covariates X contains region of auction dummies, month of auction dummies, age of production 
line, and the number of years that the equipment was held in inventory by Caterpillar.
19  The variable    at
denotes the proportion of equipment produced on assembly line a in year   that are sold at auction in year 
t.   ) ( h  is a selectivity adjustment that depends on    at .
20  The adjustment is included because of the 
possibility that goods reaching the resale market are not representative of the population, perhaps due to 
transaction costs or asymmetric information.  In such cases, the optimal selling rule for consumers is 
determined  by  cut-off  functions,  whereby  consumers  sell  equipment  if  their  quality  is  below  some 
threshold.  The function  ) ( h  is modeled as the logarithm of    at .
21  
The parameters of interest ( 1984  - 2000  ) represent the US-foreign log price differential for each 
year of production and are identified from variation in country of origin of assembly lines within model-
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Ideally, I would also make comparisons of equipment within auctions.  However, there are not sufficient data to 
make these comparisons reliably.  
18 Estimates are qualitatively similar when estimating the models in levels.  Tables are available upon request.
19 While information on the market to which the equipment was originally shipped is not available, the region in 
which equipment was resold at auction is.  States or countries of auction are collapsed into the following seven 
regions: Pacific and Mountain Census regions; West North Central, West South Central and East North Central 
Census regions; South Atlantic, Middle Atlantic and New England Census regions; Asia and Australia; Mexico; 
Canada; and Europe.  The results are robust to finer groupings of states and countries.  
20 The function h( ) is an approximation to the selectivity adjustment of an arbitrary model of auction market 
participation in which participation depends on a single index that is fully absorbed by assembly-line × production 
year × auction year dummies (Ahn and Powell 1993; Card and Payne 1997).  While I find some evidence of non-
random selection into the sample, the results are robust to the exclusion of the selectivity function as well as to 
varying specifications of the function h( ).  
21 Because the data span production year 1984-2000, there is no need to include a US main-effect in this model, as it 
would be collinear with the production year and country of origin interactions.  Also, this model does not explicitly 
have year effects because they are absorbed by the cohort effects.  16
classes.  Because of the presence of cohort effects, these parameters are only identified from models that 
are produced both in the US and abroad.  Consequently, in specifications that include cohort effects, I 
limit the sample to such models.  Of the 353 models represented in the sample, 23% have production lines 
both in the US and abroad.  These production lines account for 40% of the equipment in the sample.       
Model (14) is flexible and fully accounts for heterogeneity across calendar year, production year, 
models,  as  well  as  their  interactions.    Comparing  equipment  within  model-classes  ensures  that  the 
estimates are not driven by changes in the composition of US and foreign equipment over time.  The 
region dummies  ensure, among other  things, that the estimated US-foreign price differentials  are  not 
driven by changes in distribution patterns of US and foreign equipment, as could be the case if production 
patterns changed during the dispute.  These regional differences could matter because used US and foreign 
equipment  may  be  systematically  different  if  they  are  distributed  to  regional  markets  with  different 
demands for optional characteristics, or if the equipment is exposed to different climatic conditions.      
After examining the US-foreign log price differential across individual production years, I then 
estimate the average difference in the US-foreign log price differential between the dispute and the non-
dispute periods:
(15) ic at i i i c ic h p                 ) ( DISPUTE US US X ' ln .
i DISPUTE   is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  the  equipment  is  produced  during  the  period  of  the 
dispute.
22  The parameter   is approximately a weighted average of  u P P 2 2 /   across model-classes, 
where  u P 2  is the baseline (non-dispute) price of US equipment in a given model-class, and  2 P   is as 
given by equation (10).  If US and foreign equipment are reasonably close substitutes in the non-dispute 
period,  or  if  there  were  no  significant  supply-  or  demand-shocks  during  this  period,  then:
  u u yu w w P        2 , which has an interpretation as a change in service flows for the marginal consumer.  
I can then use an of estimate  u P 2  to back out this term from  2 P  .  Because of the supply-shock that 
affected US plants during the dispute, and because US and foreign equipment are not perfect substitutes, 
                                                
22 The dispute period is defined as the period spanning mid-1991 to early 1998.  I consider 1991 a dispute year and 
1998 a non-dispute year, but estimates are robust to alternative definitions.  17
   u f yu yu w w        is  likely  to  be  positive  (but  small).    Under  these  conditions,   ˆ   will  somewhat
underestimate the effect of a quality-shock on prices.  
For reference, I also estimate a baseline model which uses all of the data, but does not include 
cohort effects and is therefore less flexible:
(16) im i i i i i i t m imt                    DISPUTE US DISPUTE US Age Age lnp
2
2 1 .
Specification (16) includes model fixed-effects ( m  ), as well as a quadratic polynomial in age, and auction 
year dummies ( t  ).  The disadvantage of this model is that the estimate of   will pick up the residual 
effect of vintage-level variation in price resulting from market-level shocks that disproportionately affect 
US goods, for example, US production cuts.  This problem is not as serious when using cohort effects 
because, within a market, these shocks will affect the prices of both US and foreign machines.  
The last two outcomes I will consider are volume of trade and list prices.  I will outline the 
statistical models used to test these predictions when discussing the data utilized in these analyses.
5.1 The Effect of Labor Unrest on Appraisals
I will begin by testing how the labor dispute affected the physical condition of the construction 
equipment using condition reports (appraisals) from Equipment Watch data collectors.  I then analyze 
resale prices to investigate the effect of the dispute on the economic quality of equipment.  Estimating the 
effect of the labor dispute on resale prices is more challenging than measuring the effect of the dispute on 
quality appraisals because resale prices are determined by many factors that do not necessarily affect the 
physical quality of equipment, including market conditions, consumer tastes and market structure.  For this 
reason, and for purposes of comparability, the statistical models employed will be the same as those used 
for the price outcome, described in equations (14)-(16).
The physical condition outcome consists of six categories, ranging from “poor” to” excellent”.
23  
Table  1 reports the proportion of equipment  belonging to  each category.  A  majority of the 79% of 
equipment with a reported condition falls in two categories: “good” or “very good”.  The next most 
frequently reported category is “fair”, with 8.6% of the reported conditions.  The ordered nature of the 
                                                
23 The six condition categories are poor, fair, good, very good, excellent and new.  Because I am interested in resale 
outcomes, I discard 106 pieces of new equipment sold at auction that appear in the sample. 18
appraisals data suggests the use of an ordered probit model to estimate the effects of the labor dispute on 
quality.  A drawback to the ordered probit model, however, is that it is not well-suited to a fixed-effects 
strategy.  Unlike some other non-linear  models with categorical outcomes, an ordered logit or probit 
model that conditions-out fixed-effects using a minimum sufficient statistic has not been developed.
24  For 
this reason, I will first present specifications using a “monetized condition index” (MCI) as an outcome.  
This index weights the condition categories by their impact on price.  Concretely, the index is constructed 
by regressing log transaction prices on dummy variables for each condition category, including a unknown 
category, a set of other covariates, and cohort fixed-effects.
25  The estimated coefficients from the six 
condition dummies multiplied by 100 are used as the values for the index.  I normalize the index so that 
equipment appraised as poor takes on the value of 0, with the remaining condition categories valued 
relative to poor equipment.  Appendix Table 1 reports the values of the index for the five categories, as 
well as the standard errors for the coefficients, with R
2 corresponding to the regression used to estimate the 
index.    The  mapping  of  the  condition  index  to  the  condition  categories  appears  reasonable―better 
condition categories correspond to higher average prices at auction.  
I begin by examining the regression adjusted US-foreign monetary condition index differential by 
individual production year.  These are estimated by fitting equation (14) to the data, but using the MCI as 
the dependent variable instead of log price.  Figure 3, which plots  1984 ˆ   through  2000 ˆ  , shows a dip in the 
regression-adjusted  US-foreign  monetary  condition  index  differential  during  the  period  when  the 
Caterpillar  UAW  workers  did  not  have  a  contract.    The  figure  reveals  that  US-  and  foreign-made 
equipment received similar  appraisal reports  before 1989, followed by a  relative improvement  in  the 
condition of US equipment produced in 1989 and 1990.  In 1991, the first year of the dispute, the US-
foreign MCI differential fell sharply, and remained low until 1998, when it reverted to pre-dispute levels.
Table 2 quantifies the average change in the US-foreign MCI differential from the non-dispute 
period to the dispute period.  Estimates from the baseline model (16) using the MC outcome are presented 
in column (1).  The model shows in an estimated US-dispute interaction of -0.21, with a t-ratio of -2.33. 
The US-dispute period is associated with about a one fifth of a percent reduction in resale prices of US-
                                                
24 A second disadvantage to this model is that it requires discarding equipment with unknown category ratings. 
25 A description of the construction of this index is available in Appendix B. 19
made equipment via the change in condition categories, an effect that is small in magnitude, but estimated 
precisely.  Columns (2)-(6) present results from specifications that are variants of equation (15), and 
employ  model  ×  production  year  ×  auction  year  (cohort)  fixed-effects,  again  using  the  MCI  as  the 
dependent variable.  In each of these specifications, the US-dispute interaction is negative and statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  In column (2), for example, the estimated effect is -0.59 with a t-ratio 
of 5.4.  This estimate is robust to the introduction of additional controls, including the region of auction, 
production-line age, time in inventory, and a selectivity adjustment (column 3).  The interaction term 
grows in magnitude when a US × production year trend is introduced in column (4).  Columns (5) and (6) 
show that estimates of the US-dispute interaction are robust to whether the comparison made is pre-
dispute/dispute or dispute/post-dispute.  These results are consistent with the pattern observed in Figure 3, 
where the US-premium before and after the dispute have similar magnitudes.    
Additional noteworthy features of Table 4 are the estimated coefficients on the US-main effect 
and the age of the production-line at the time of the equipment’s production.  The estimated US main-
effect is positive and significant in all but one models, indicating that US equipment produced in the non-
dispute years was in somewhat better physical condition than foreign equipment once it appeared in the 
resale market, even after controlling for region of sale and other factors.  Equipment produced on older 
production lines was in better condition once they reach the resale market (column 3), an effect that is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that learning-by-doing may play a factor in the quality
of construction equipment.
26
Table 3 shows that the finding that appraisal ratings decline among dispute-affected equipment is 
not  an artifact of the construction of the  monetary condition index.  This  table presents results from 
ordered probit models, using the equipment appraisal as the dependent variable.  As already noted, the 
ordered probit model is not suited for fixed-effects estimation.  Therefore, the parameters in this model are 
not identified by comparisons of US and foreign equipment within cohorts over time.  Rather, I include a 
relatively parsimonious set of covariates.
27  Because cohort effects are not included I include transactions 
in models that were produced exclusively in the US or abroad.  The estimates from the ordered probit 
                                                
26 This result that may be considered in contrast to Thompson (2001) who finds a tradeoff between the age of the 
production line and quality of World War II era Liberty Ships.  20
models show a statistically significant downward shift in the physical quality of the equipment in the 
dispute period.  For example, looking at the marginal effects, US equipment produced during the dispute 
were associated with declines in the probability of being rates “excellent” or “very good.”      
5.2 The Effect of Labor Unrest on Resale Prices
Appraisal  reports  provide  evidence that  the  physical  quality  of  US-made  equipment  declined 
relative to foreign-made equipment at the time of the dispute.  I now consider whether the dispute affected 
the economic quality of the construction equipment.  Figure 4 plots the regression-adjusted US-foreign log 
price differential for each production year, obtained by estimating model (14).  The figure is striking in its 
similarity  to  Figure  3.    In  both  figures,  the  series  trend  upwards  prior  to  the  dispute,  drop  during
production year 1991, and revert back to pre-dispute levels around 1998.  The figure shows that equipment 
made in the US in 1990 sold at almost a 4% premium relative to comparable foreign equipment from the 
same production  year, whereas  US  equipment  from the  1991  vintage  sold  at  a  2%  discount.
28    This 
discount persisted through most of the dispute-era vintages, with the exception of 1997―the last full year 
of the dispute―when the US-foreign resale price differential reverted back to pre-dispute levels.  
Table 4 presents estimates of the difference in the US-foreign log price differential between the 
dispute period and the non-dispute period.  The baseline specification in column (1) presents estimates
obtained by fitting (16) to the data.  The US-dispute coefficient is estimated as 0.011 (t=0.85).  Evidently, 
the baseline model does not reveal much of a change in the US-foreign price differential following the 
dispute and, if anything, it shows that the change is positive.  However, the sign on the estimated US-
dispute coefficient reverses when model (15) is estimated.  Using this more flexible model, with cohort 
fixed-effects, it appears that machines produced in an environment of labor strife are discounted by the 
resale market.  In column (4), for example, the estimated coefficient on the US-dispute interaction variable 
is -0.054, with a t-ratio of 3, implying that the US-foreign resale price differential was approximately 5.5% 
higher for equipment produced in non-dispute vintages than dispute vintages.
29 The reversal in sign on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 The covariates in Table 3 are a quadratic polynomial in age, twenty equipment class dummies (broad equipment 
groupings), auction year dummies, years in inventory, and production line age.
28 It is not surprising that such a large break in the US-foreign price differential would be observed in 1991.  
Negotiations had been in progress since at least July and, as discussed in Section II, there were signs that workers
knew the company would take a hard line as early as 1990.   
29 The estimated 5.5% discount is essentially a “reduced-form” estimate of the effect of the labor dispute on the value 
of equipment.  This is because the comparison being made is between US and foreign products, and not all plants in 21
estimated US-dispute interaction from the baseline model to models with cohort fixed-effects suggests that
it is important to account for market-wide shocks, such as the US production cuts, via inclusion of these 
fixed-effects.  Consistent with this interpretation, we do not see this reversal when using the appraisal 
outcome, which is to be expected because such demand- and supply-shocks should not directly affect 
appraisal reports, while they should affect resale prices.           
The estimated US-dispute interaction coefficient is robust to the inclusion of additional controls.  
The  selectivity  adjustment,  while  generally  significant,  does  not  greatly  affect  the  estimates  via  its 
inclusion.  The estimate is also robust to controlling for the number of years the equipment was held by 
Caterpillar in inventory, age of the production lines at the time equipment was produced, and a US × 
production year trend, which allows for differential trends in resale prices for US- and foreign-made 
equipment by vintage.  Another robustness check is that the estimated US-dispute discount rate be of the 
same  order  of  magnitude  when  making  a  pre-dispute/dispute  versus  dispute/post-dispute  comparison.  
Indeed, comparing the US-dispute estimates in columns (5) and (6) reveals that they are both negative, 
though larger in magnitude in the dispute/post-dispute comparison.  These results show that the premium 
US produced equipment enjoyed before 1991, and after 1997, virtually disappeared during the dispute.  
The dispute period is associated with a substantially larger discount of US equipment than would be 
implied by the change in the condition categories alone.  This comparison is made explicit in column (7) 
where the condition categories are included as controls.  Comparing columns (7) and (3), one can see that 
the inclusion of the condition category dummies has only a marginal effect on the estimated US-dispute 
interaction.  Consumers appear to be more sensitive to quality differences than the independent appraisers.
As an additional specification, I use the fact that some Caterpillar equipment contained engines 
produced by other manufactures.  Approximately 23% of the equipment in the sample contained engines 
that were outsourced, primarily from Perkins Engines.
30,31  I can test whether resale prices of Caterpillar 
equipment produced in the US during the dispute containing engines produced by other manufactures 
                                                                                                                                                             
the US were subject to the labor dispute.  As noted earlier, approximately 87% of employment in the US took place 
in unionized plants.  While I do not have information on the percent of equipment produced in unionized plants, 
using the 87% figure would imply that the dispute was associated with a 6.3% discount on US equipment, once the 
coefficient has been rescaled.      
30 In December 1997 Caterpillar purchased Perkins Engines.
31 Model and production year of equipment was matched to information from the Equipment Watch’s Green Guide
to obtain the manufacturer of its engine.  22
behaved differently than dispute-affected equipment with Caterpillar engines.  If one of the reasons for 
discounting machines produced during labor unrest is that engines were of inferior quality, then equipment 
produced in the US during the dispute containing engines produced by other manufacturers should receive 
less of a discount than equipment with Caterpillar engines.  
Table  5  presents  the  results  of  the  log  resale  price  model  for  equipment  with  and  without 
Caterpillar engines.  The estimated US-dispute interaction is estimated at -0.037 (t-=3.1) for machines 
whose engines are produced in-house versus -0.011 (t=0.42) for machines whose engines are outsourced.  
While the estimated coefficient is more than twice as large for equipment containing Caterpillar engines as 
compared to machines equipped with other manufacturer’s engines, the difference between the estimates
is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
32  
5.3  Assessing the magnitude of possible biases from market-level shocks
The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the US main-effect in Table 4 suggest that,
before and after the dispute, pieces of US- and foreign-made equipment were not perfect substitutes, even 
within the narrow markets considered in this paper.
33  Recalling equation (10), market-level shocks will 
affect the relative price of US and foreign used equipment if they are imperfect substitutes in the non-
dispute period.  Using the theoretical model, I conduct a simple calibration to determine the sensitivity of 
the US-foreign price differential to market-level shocks given the estimates in Table 3.
Equation (10) implies that in a given market: 
(17) u u u yu P w w P 2 2 / ) ( ln        u u f yu yu P w w 2 / ) )( (        .
34  
The quantity of interest is  u u u yu P w w 2 / ) (     , while the second term captures how a market-level shock, 
which  shifts  the  marginal  consumer  from  yu    to  yu    ,  affects  the  relative  price  of  US  and  foreign 
equipment.  For the sake of argument, suppose that the dispute was not associated with a quality-shock
( u u w w   ),  and  that  the  negatively  estimated  US-dispute  interaction  is  coming  about  entirely  from  a 
                                                
32 Imprecision may stem in part from the prevalence of rebuilt engines in used construction equipment.   
33 Explanations for this premium include the possibility that consumers discounted foreign equipment because they 
could not determine whether the equipment was one of a small number of equipment not intended for sale in the US, 
and because it may not pass EPA emission standards, or simply that US-made machinery was better made than 
foreign machinery in non-dispute years.
34 For the sake of parsimony I will consider a single market.  The analysis extends to the average of many markets.    23
market-level demand-shock  that  shifted  the  marginal  consumer  from yu  to  yu      ( yu    < yu  ).    The
estimated US-foreign log price differential of 4% in the non-dispute period implies that the marginal 
consumer’s willingness to pay for equipment would have had to have fallen by a factor of four in order to 
generate  the  observed  change  in  the  US-foreign  price  differential  of  5%.
35    Given  that  total  factor 
productivity (TFP) in the construction equipment industry was stable, and Caterpillar’s profit was rising, it 
is unlikely that there was such an extreme shift in demand for Caterpillar equipment during this period.
36  
As already discussed, there were changes on the supply-side of the market.  The dispute was 
associated with approximately a 12% reduction in the production of US goods relative to foreign goods.  
This supply-shift implies that the stock of machines in the market would have fallen by at most 6% in 
steady-state.
37  The US main-effect implies that 04 . 0 ) ) ( ( 2   yu u f u P w w  .  Assuming that  ~U(  , ), 
following a 6% reduction in the stock, the marginal consumer becomes:
           06 . 0 ) ( 06 . ) ( 06 . 94 . 0             yu f yf f yf yu y y
                   . ) ) ( ( 06 . 04 . 0 ) ) ( ( 2 2   u f u yu u f u P w w P w w             
In order to assess the magnitude of the bias term in (17), it is necessary to make an assumption about  ’s 
willingness  to  pay  relative  to yu  .    In this  context,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that heterogeneity in 
consumer willingness to pay for equipment comes about from productivity differences.  Using plant-level 
data from the Census of Manufacturers, Syverson (2004) estimates that within 4-digit SIC industry, the 
95
th percentile of TFP is approximately four times as large as the 5
th percentile, on average.  Assuming that 
the ratio in willingness to pay between   and  yu  consumers is approximately 4-1 we obtain: 
0496 . 0 4 ) ) ( ( 06 . 04 . ) ) ( ( 06 . 04 . ) ) ( ( 2 2 2           yu u f u u f u yu u f u P w w P w w P w w    .
                                                
35 To see why, note that  04 . / ) ( 2    u u f yu P w w  .  In order for  05 . ln    p ―the magnitude of the estimated US-
dispute interaction― the term u u f yu P w w 2 / ) (      would have to be approximately -0.01, implying that  yu    = 4 / yu  .  
36 TFP in the construction industry grew by 0.39% between 1990-1995, and fell by 1% between 1995 and 2000 
(Fernald and Ramnath 2004).
37 There is a 6% reduction in stock if Caterpillar’s foreign plants did not increase production in response to US 
production cuts, there were no other competitors in this market, and the US market share was 50%.  If increased 
production from foreign plants directly offset reduced US production, then the marginal consumer  yu   would not 
change, and the production-shock would not have affected the relative price of used US and foreign equipment.  24
Referring  back  to  equation  (17),  the  component  of  the  difference-in-difference  in  log  price  that  is 
attributable to the production-cuts is then bounded between 0 and 0.01, or less than one percentage point.
38  
Using the estimated US premium in the non-dispute period, and plausible estimates for the degree 
of variability in TFP distribution in this market, I conclude through this simple calibration exercise that the 
supply-shock  should  only  have  a  small  positive  effect  on  the  change  in  the  US-foreign  log  price 
differential given the non-dispute US premium.
39  Moreover, market-level demand-shocks would have had
to have been extraordinarily large in order to account for the observed difference-in-difference in log 
price.    Therefore,  I  conclude  that  the  US-dispute  interaction  primarily  reflects  shifts  in  demand  for 
equipment of US origin.  As I have ruled out many alternative explanations for the changing US-foreign 
price differential in the statistical model, I interpret the US-dispute interaction as primarily reflecting a 
change in service-flows for dispute-affected equipment.
5.4 The Effect of Labor Unrest on Resale Rates
Equation (13) from the theoretical model implies that worsening equipment quality should lead to 
higher resale rates.  However, as discussed, the prediction for resale rates is ultimately ambiguous because 
a variant of the model, which allows for the quality-shock to increase the variance in quality will lead to 
the opposite prediction when there is asymmetric information.  The effect of the dispute on the resale rate 
of affected equipment can therefore shed light on the precise nature of the quality shock and how it 
manifested itself in the market.    
To test for the effect of the quality-shock on the volume of trade one can compare the volume of 
trade for US versus foreign equipment, holding constant relevant factors.  However, this approach is 
problematic: while detailed assembly line level production data are available, data on exports and imports 
are not.  Since most of the auctions considered in this paper occur in the US, changes in the number of 
goods exported would result in changes in the estimated US-foreign differential in volume of trade, even if 
the relative resale rates for US and foreign equipment were to remain unchanged.
An alternative measure of the resale rate is whether a piece of equipment has been resold in the 
auction market conditional on appearing in the US resale market.  The sample size is large enough that 
                                                
38 This bound is obtained by noting that: 0< yu u f u yu u f u P w w P w w        ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( 2 2 <.0096.  25
individual pieces of equipment may appear multiple times as they are resold at auction.  In fact, about 
8.5% of the equipment was resold at least twice in the sample.  This feature of the data can be exploited by 
constructing a measure of the equipment-specific resale rate.  Specifically, the resale rate measure is 
defined  as  the  number  of  units  of  equipment  that  were  resold  multiple  times  in  production  line  × 
production year × region groups.            
To model the resale rate conditional on other variables, I employ count data regression models.  I 
use a cell-level dataset where equipment characteristics are collapsed into production line × production 
year × region cells.  The number of pieces of equipment that appear multiple times in each of these cells,
r lm y  , is modeled as:
(18) ), X ' ) (ln( exp ] , | [        m m r lm r lm y E x                                                                      
where  m   represents model fixed-effects, r denotes region of auction, and the X-vector of explanatory 
variables contains the  logarithm of the  number of pieces of equipment  sold in  the  production  line × 
production year × region group, production year dummies, region dummies, and production line vintage.
40  
Model (18) can be estimated using Poisson conditional maximum likelihood, conditioning on the count 
total  r r lm y
  for each model.  I compute robust standard errors that are consistent in the presence of 
over dispersion.
41  
Table 6 presents conditional fixed-effect Poisson models for multiple sales in the sample (columns 
2-5).  For reference, columns (1) and (2) present estimates from the standard Poisson model without fixed-
effects.
42  All of the specifications control for the log of the number of equipment that appeared in the 
auction resale market in a given cell.  As expected, the estimated coefficient on this variable is estimated 
                                                                                                                                                             
39  A distribution of consumer heterogeneity with substantial skew may lead to a larger bias term.  However, this bias 
will necessarily be positive, which works against detecting a quality effect.   
40 In practice a more flexible set of fixed-effects may be used, for example interactions of model, production year, 
and region.  Unfortunately, these specifications yield few observations per cell, which may lead to inconsistent 
estimates in a non-linear model such as the one I am estimating.     
41 The fixed-effects Poisson maximum likelihood estimator of β is consistent if the conditional mean does not equal 
the conditional variance, if equation (18) is a correct specification, although the standard errors are inconsistent.   I 
follow Wooldridge (1999) to compute standard errors that are robust to over-dispersion.   
42 To compute robust standard errors in the Poisson model I allow: ) exp( ) Var(    ' x x i i  | y r lm ,  1   , where   is an 
over dispersion parameter.  The robust standard errors thus equal the usual Poisson standard errors multiplied by the 
square root of .  I estimate  by:  i
n
i
i i y y y k n ˆ / ) ˆ ( ) ( ˆ
1
2 1 
     .  See Cameron and Trivedi (1998; p. 63-65) on 
robust Poisson.26
close to unity.  The models show that equipment produced in the US during the dispute period had a 
substantially  higher  resale  rates  than  other  equipment.    In  column  (3),  for  example,  the  US-dispute 
interaction has a coefficient of 0.26, with a t-ratio of 2.  To interpret the magnitude of the coefficient, note 
that  exp(0.26)=1.3,  which  implies  that the  incidence  of  multiple  sales  is  30%  higher  for  equipment 
originating from US-based production lines during the labor dispute, other things held constant.  The US
main-effect is large and negative.  In column (3) the US main-effect has a coefficient of -0.38 (t=-3.5).  
One explanation for the negative US main-effect is that imported equipment tends to pass through more 
intermediaries before reaching final buyers.  An alternative explanation is that the volume of trade in the 
resale market for US goods is lower in the non-dispute period because the quality of US goods is higher, 
as predicted by the theoretical model.
Column (4) makes the dispute/post-dispute comparison.  In this model the US-dispute interaction 
has a coefficient of 0.23, but is not statistically significant.  The imprecision in this case is not surprising 
as equipment pieces from the relatively recent post-dispute vintages have not had time to reach the resale 
market in great numbers.  The estimated US-dispute interaction in column (5), which makes the pre-
dispute/dispute comparison, is 0.24, with a t-ratio of 1.9.  Large and positive estimates yielded by both the 
dispute/post-dispute and pre-dispute comparisons strengthens the evidence that the change in resale rates
for  US  equipment  occurred  precisely  for  dispute-era  vintages  and  that  change  is  not  the  result  of  a 
differential trend between these two groups.
Higher resale rates of US equipment indicate that the dispute-era quality-shock was most likely
not characterized by adverse selection, as that would have reduced the size of the resale market.  Rather, 
the evidence is consistent with worsening quality being observed by all parties in the market.  According 
to this version of the model, volume of trade rose because consumers seeking to maintain a stable average 
quality of the equipment in their portfolio sold faster depreciating products more quickly.  
          
5.5 The Market for New Equipment
The outcomes discussed in this paper all relate to resale market characteristics of the construction 
equipment in the sample.  The theoretical model also predicts that a quality-shock will lead to a (small) 
decline in the price of new equipment.  To test this prediction, I collected list prices for 180 models of 27
Caterpillar  equipment  for  the  years  1992  through  2000  from  the  Equipment  Watch  Green  Guide.
43  
Because list prices correspond to models, rather than to specific production lines, an estimation strategy 
employing comparisons between US and foreign equipment within model classes is not possible.  Using 
the  serial  number  guide  previously  described,  I  linked  the  models  to  the  country  of  production.    If 
Caterpillar (or the market) was aware of quality declines at its US plants during the dispute, model classes 
with a higher share of US-made equipment may have sold at discount relative to models with a larger 
share of foreign-made equipment.  
For each model the fraction of equipment produced in the US was calculated by production year.  
This variable measures the vulnerability of each model-class vintage to the dispute.  Column (1) of Table 
8 presents results in which the fraction of equipment in a model class produced with the United States is 
interacted with a dispute period dummy.  In column (2), I compare models exclusively produced in the US 
to models exclusively produced abroad.  Both specifications include model fixed effects that hold constant 
both any changes Caterpillar may have made to its product mix in the period of the dispute, and year 
effects.  In both of the specifications, the R
2 is extremely high, at 0.99.  Most of the variation across new 
equipment prices can be accounted for by permanent differences across models.  Still, the estimates reveal 
significantly higher growth in list prices of models that have a larger share of US production in the post 
dispute period relative to  the  pre-dispute  period.   In column  (2),  for  example, the  list  prices of  US-
produced models are estimated to be 1.8% larger than foreign-produced models after the dispute relative 
to the dispute period, with a corresponding t-ratio of 2.6.  
Figure 5 plots the growth in list prices for models produced exclusively in the US relative to those 
produced exclusively abroad.
44  The price of model classes produced exclusively in the US grew at about 
the same rate as model classes produced exclusively abroad between 1992 and 1998 but grew about 1.5% 
faster than those produced abroad after 1998, when the dispute was over.  Of course, the discussion in 
previous sections on the difficulty of obtaining estimates of the US-dispute interaction free of supply 
effects still applies and, in fact, in the new goods setting this confounder is even more serious than in the 
                                                
43 A disadvantage of using list prices is that, in practice, actual prices paid may differ from list prices because of 
discounts. 
44 The figure is obtained by estimating a model with the logarithm of model list price as the dependant variable, year 
of production dummies, and interactions of an indicator for whether the model was produced in the US with 
production year dummies.  The estimated interaction terms are plotted in Figure 5.28
resale case.  Because the list price data is not disaggregated by production-line, I cannot employ the same 
estimation strategy used in  the  resale market.   Therefore, estimates  for list  prices may be viewed as 
underestimating the effects of the dispute on new prices, as the supply-shock should, in theory, lead to an 
upwards shift in the price of models dominated by US equipment.
Because the evidence suggests that new dispute-affected equipment was discounted, some of the 
costs due to the lower quality product were borne by Caterpillar and not by its consumers.  Keeping in 
mind the possible upward bias in the US-dispute estimated due to reduced supply, the magnitude of the 
estimated US-dispute effect on list prices is broadly consistent with what is predicted by the theoretical 
model following a latent reduction in US quality―new US prices fell, but the reduction was smaller than 
the discounting seen in the resale market.  
         
VI.  Discussion
On  balance,  the  analysis  of  resale  prices  suggests  that  the  equipment  produced  in  facilities 
undergoing labor disputes was discounted by the resale market by about 5%.  This reduction in value may 
arise  from  a  reduction  in  salvage  value,  reduced  productivity  of  the  equipment,  increased  operating 
expenses, or some combination of these three factors.  If consumers knew the origin of equipment, which 
is likely because the serial number guide employed here is in the public domain, then discounting may 
have occurred because there was common knowledge that certain vintages of US equipment were of 
inferior quality.  However, common knowledge is not the only channel leading to these effects.  Buyers 
could have been unaware that entire vintages were affected, but were able to determine through inspection 
that some equipment pieces were of inferior quality.  
Since the average resale price of US equipment sold is approximately $80,000, the estimated 
dispute  effect  implies  that  equipment  buyers  paid  approximately  $4,000  fewer  dollars  for  equipment 
produced in a facility undergoing a labor dispute.  The model of the durable goods resale market suggests 
that the change in resale price for dispute-affected equipment relative to the comparison group can be 
interpreted as the change in the discounted stream of service flows for the marginal consumer. Therefore, 
a simple lower bound for the lost rents resulting from the dispute is $4,000 times the number of equipment 
affected by the dispute (approximately 100,000 pieces), resulting in a loss of service flow of more than 
$400 million.  29
An interesting question to consider is how the cost Caterpillar potentially incurred by producing 
lower quality equipment compares to the savings Caterpillar obtained by demanding concessions from the 
UAW.  This comparison is possible since the counterfactual labor contract is known — the contract Deere 
signed with the UAW in 1991 and which Caterpillar would have signed if they continued with pattern 
bargaining.  Assuming that dispute-affected equipment experienced $400 million in lost service flows, as 
estimated, the dispute would have led to at most $400 million reduction in Caterpillar revenue arising from 
reduced product quality (and exactly $400 million if increased physical depreciation of older equipment 
was fully shifted to new prices).  According to industry analysts at the time of the strike, the contract 
signed with Deere would have increased labor costs at Caterpillar by about $250 million over the life of 
the three year contract [Kelly (1992)].  Over the entire 6-plus years of the dispute the difference in wage 
bills between Caterpillar and Deere was on the order of $500 million.
45  If Caterpillar did not revert back 
to the Deere settlement after six years, then the net present value of breaking from pattern is on the order 
of $1.4 billon, outweighing even the maximum costs Caterpillar could have incurred due to the quality 
reductions alone.  
Of course, the dispute led to additional costs in addition to lower product quality.  These include 
lost sales due to reduced production, as well as lost sales due to consumers switching brands, perhaps 
because of lower quality equipment.  While I am unable to estimate the potentially large loss in Caterpillar 
market share relative to the counterfactual situation of no dispute, it is possible to bound the direct costs of 
the strike due to lost sales.  The two strikes lasted approximately two year.  I estimate that the strikes led to 
approximately  a  12%  reduction  in  output  in  affected  plants.    Assuming  that  none  of  this  reduced 
production was offset by increased foreign production, or future sales, this reduction led to approximately 
3,250 fewer pieces of new equipment produced.  In this scenario, production cuts would have led to $970 
million in lost revenue, given an average list price of new equipment of $300,000.  Even if there were zero 
costs associated with producing equipment (clearly false), this reduction in profits would not have been 
enough to close the gap between the benefits the firm obtained from breaking with the union to the direct 
                                                
45 In 1995 Deere signed a new contract with the UAW that extended the base wages set in the previous contract 
[Daily Labor Report (1995)].  30
and indirect costs of the dispute.
46  This being said, it is important to reemphasize that there were other 
costs in the strike which are not incorporated into this calculation.
The  precise  mechanism  which  led  workers  to  produce  inferior  equipment  has  not  been  fully 
addressed.  For both the appraisal and resale price outcomes, resale market participants discounted US 
equipment produced through virtually the entire period of the dispute, indicating that quality differences in 
US-dispute equipment cannot be solely attributable to the use of salaried or replacement workers.
47  The 
timing of the quality effects is consistent with findings in Krueger and Mas (2004) who observe a similar 
pattern in the production of defective tires at Bridgestone/Firestone during a period of labor unrest.  Katz, 
Kochan and Gobeille (1983) find that the industrial relations measure with the strongest correlation to the 
production of General Motors automobiles that did not pass inspection is the negotiation time for a new 
contract, also consistent with the evidence cited in this paper as the dispute between Caterpillar and the 
UAW was characterized by difficult negotiations.
A striking feature of this dispute is its substantial length and the fact that the union ultimately 
agreed to a contract that was virtually identical to the one initially proposed by the employer.  Why did the 
union held out for so long in bargaining, even though the potential direct cost of a strike to Caterpillar was 
diminished by the  company’s  insistence that striking workers would be permanently replaced? When 
viewed  through  the  lens  of  a  war-of-attrition  model  of  bargaining,  the  reduction  in  product  quality 
documented here provides one way to make sense of this aspect of the dispute.
48  
In  the  war-of-attrition  model  of  bargaining,  two  parties  with  linear  costs  of  delay—that  are 
unknown to the opposing party—fight over a fixed prize in a winner-take-all contest.  The game ends 
when one party capitulates.  Delay occurs because parties do not know the opponents cost of delay with 
certainty, so bargaining continues until one party is sufficiently convinced that the opposing party has 
lower cost of continuation.  In equilibrium, the party with the higher cost of continuation capitulates form, 
                                                
46 This is not to say that the union did not benefit from reducing effort.  Lower product quality represents an elevated 
cost of delay for the employer and, in theory, may have led to the firm to settle at a wage that was higher than if there 
were no product quality reduction.  
47 One application of this finding is to legislation that seeks to amend the National Labor Relations Act to prohibit 
employers from hiring permanent replacement workers during strike.  For example, in 1993 the US House of 
Representatives voted 239-190 to amend the National Labor Relations Act (the bill never reached the Senate due to a 
threatened filibuster.)  The findings here suggest that whether replacement workers are building defective products 
due to inexperience should not be a central focus of this debate.31
which occurs when the marginal cost of delay is equal to the size of the award times the probability that 
the opponent will capitulate conditional on having waited up to that point.
49  
That the dispute was of substantial length, and that there was no compromise, is suggestive of an 
outcome from this kind of war-of-attrition bargaining.  Of course, this model is well-suited to explain the 
duration and outcome of strikes, when the firm clearly faces a cost of delay.  However, the dispute in this 
study is characterized by long periods of bargaining without strikes, where it is not obvious that the firm 
had anything to lose by not signing a contract.  Reduced product quality, as documented in this paper, 
could play a role in explaining why the union would not settle with the employer immediately.    By 
reducing effort, the union imposes a cost to the employer that could be significant in magnitude, but also a 
cost that may be difficult for the union to estimate precisely.  The existence of such a cost, in the presence 
of  asymmetric  information,  could  have  led  the  union  to  hold  out  in  bargaining  in  the  hope that  the 
marginal cost of delaying an agreement arising from lower product quality was higher than the marginal 
cost of delay for the union.
50  In this case, the union eventually gave in when it became sufficiently clear 
that the firm’s marginal cost of delay due to reduced product quality was not high enough.
51,52
                                                                                                                                                             
48 See Kennan and Wilson (1989) and Card and Olson (1995) for a discussion of the war-of-attrition model in the 
context of strikes, and associated empirical tests.  
49 Concretely, using the notation of Kennan and Wilson (1989), each party has a marginal cost of continuation ci
which is unknown to the opposing party.  The size of the award is v.  A party holds out until the marginal cost of 
delay is equal to the marginal benefit, which is equal to the size of the award times the probability that the other 
player will quit in that period.  That is, a party quits when c(i)=v*qt, where qt is the probability of the opponent 
exiting at time t conditional on reaching t.  In equilibrium, a player quits when the maximum profitable duration 
before concession—v/ci—is equal to 1/ qt .   The party with the higher marginal cost of continuation exits first.                   
50 Another cost of delay to the firm is the possibility of consumer boycotts.
51 There are of course other models that can be used to explain some of the features of the dispute.  For example, in 
Hart’s (1989) model of bargaining, strikes of substantial length are shown to occur when there are delays between 
rounds in bargaining, asymmetric information of the firm’s rents, and a non-linear cost of delay for the firm.  Under 
these conditions, the union has option value from delaying settlements.  Reduced product quality could have created 
a non-linear component in the cost of delay necessary for a lengthy dispute.  In MacLeod (2003), the threat of 
conflict  ensures  that  management  will  reward  employees  as  a  function  of  management’s  true  assessment  of 
performance.  In this context, that the threat of reduced performance was exercised suggests that management’s 
assessment  of  profitability  diverged  from  the  workers  assessment,  perhaps  because  Caterpillar  was  demanding 
concessions from its workers while its earnings were on the rise.  
52 Knowing that quality was declining management could have changed monitoring intensity. However, this is an 
environment where eliciting additional effort would be difficult.  Because production is complex, management would 
likely have had to employ substantially more supervisors in order to effectively monitor the workers.  Here is a case 
where it may have been more efficient for the company to rely on stable industrial relations than on additional 
monitoring to elicit high-levels of effort. 32
VII.  Conclusion
The evidence assembled in this paper provides consistent support for the conclusion that labor 
unrest impacted the quality of production.  The temporal patterns of resale prices, appraisal reports, resale 
rates and list prices for pieces of US-made and dispute-era equipment support the theoretical model’s 
predictions for a reduction in product quality in a durable goods market.   Resale market participants 
discounted equipment produced in the US during the dispute by about 5%.  Additionally, this equipment 
was much less likely to be classified in the top condition categories, experienced resale rates that are about
30% higher than other comparable equipment, and was given a sticker price that was at least 1.5% lower.  
It is always possible that there were unobserved factors that resulted in worse physical state, lower 
resale prices, higher resale rates and lower resale prices for equipment produced in US plants during the 
span of time the UAW workers did not have a contract.  However, the research design and the statistical 
methods employed in this paper rule out many other explanations for the observed patterns, including 
supply shifts, changes in distributional patterns, differences in the composition of equipment produced at 
US and foreign plants, and changes in the composition of the workforce, as would be expected from the 
opening of several non-union plants during the dispute.  
The reduction in product quality on lost service flows was large, totaling approximately half a 
billion dollars.  There is evidence that list prices were affected, suggesting that at least some of these lost 
service flows affected Caterpillar’s profitability.  As indicated in the discussion, it unlikely that these 
losses dominated the rents Caterpillar extracted in breaking with the union.  The finding that there was a 
reduction on the effort margin during the dispute potentially helps explain why it took so long for a new 
contract to be signed between the two disputing parties.  The reduction in product quality may have 
created a cost of delay for the company that was large enough for the union to hold out in bargaining, but 
ultimately not large enough for the union to emerge victorious in a war-of-attrition.  33
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Appendix A: Descriptions of the algorithm bounding production years and the calculation of 
assembly-line level production.    
The serial number guide assigns each serial number the year the equipment with that number was 
shipped.  Serial numbers are stamped on equipment sequentially as they are produced on the assembly 
line.  As such, if the wheel loader with serial number XXX950 was shipped in  1992, XXX951 was 
shipped in 1993, and XXX952 was shipped in 1992, it must be that XXX951 was produced no later than 
1992 even though it was shipped in 1993.  Using this logic, I developed a simple algorithm that calculates 
the last year equipment could have been produced.  The algorithm allocates each piece of equipment to an 
upper bound of the year of production by assigning it the earliest year of shipment of all equipment with a 
higher, or equal, serial number.  Moving sequentially down from the last serial number in a series, cut-
points are identified as the first instance of a new year.  While this algorithm generates some error in the 
measurement  of  yearly  production,  the  measurement  error  is  unambiguously  less  severe  than  using 
shipment year as a proxy for production year.  Still, if inventory is characterized by buffer-stock behavior, 
measured production continues to underestimate true production during periods of inventory build-up and 
overestimates it during run-offs.  
As  a  corollary  to  this  procedure  assembly  line  level  yearly  production  is  estimated  as  the 
difference between the last and first serial numbers between cut-points plus 1.  Some additional care is 
taken to account for gaps in the sequence of serial numbers.  The number of years equipment is held in 
inventory by Caterpillar is estimated as the difference in shipment year and the estimated production year.  
Because  year  of  production  is  estimated,  there  are  496  observations  that  have  negative  inventories 
assigned to them.  Because discarding these observations could result in additional bias [see e.g. Bollinger 
and Chandra (2003)], they are kept in the sample.              36
  
Appendix B: Description of the Monetized Condition Index.   
The monetized condition index is constructed by estimating the equation:
, POOR UNKNOWN FAIR
GOOD GOOD VERY EXCELLENT X ' ln
P U F
G VG E
ic i i i
i i i c ic p
   
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where the vector of covariates X contains years in inventory dummies, seven region of auction dummies, 
month of auction dummies,  and age of the production line at the time the  equipment  was produced.  
Estimated coefficients  E ˆ  ,  VG ˆ  ,  G ˆ  ,  U ˆ  ,  F ˆ  , and  P ˆ  were multiplied by 100 are assigned as the values 
for the monetized condition index.  37
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Figure 3.  Regression-Adjusted US-Foreign Monetized Condition Index 
Differential by Year of Production  
Note:    This  figure  plots  1984 ˆ  - 2000 ˆ  ,  which  are  obtained  from  estimating  equation  (14),  using  the  monetary 
condition index as the dependent variable.  The sample corresponds to pieces of equipment from model years 1984 
through 2000 for transactions occurring between January 1994 and September 2002.  Only models that have both US 
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Figure 4.  Regression-Adjusted US-Foreign Log Resale Price Differential 
by Year of Production  
Note:  This figure plots  1984 ˆ  - 2000 ˆ  , which are obtained from estimating equation (14).  The sample corresponds to 
pieces of equipment from model years 1984 through 2000 for transactions occurring between January 1994 and 
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Figure 5. US-foreign List Price


















































Note:  See text for details on construction of the figure.41













Post-dispute  Full-Sample 
Transaction price 79,262 92,140 88,603 34,713 51,425 62,180 61,983
[53,556] [68,220] [65,805] [23,844] [35,042] [40,363] [50,871]
Dispute (Yes = 1) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.52
Production year 1987.3 1994.2 1998.4 1987.8 1994.0 1998.5 1991.7
[1.93] [1.86] [0.58] [1.73] [1.85] [0.68] [4.03]
Auction year 1997.9 1999.2 2001.1 1997.7 1999.1 2001.2 1998.7
[2.59] [2.0] [0.81] [2.49] [2.03] [0.79] [2.39]
Produced in the US 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.40
(Yes = 1)
Produced in US during 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.19
the dispute (Yes = 1)
Sold at auction 0.81 0.84 0.89 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.79
in the US (Yes = 1)
Age 10.5 5.0 2.7 9.9 5.1 2.7 7.0
[3.3] [2.1] [0.9] [3.0] [2.1] [0.9] [3.7]
Age of the Production  2.1 2.7 2.8 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.2
line [1.6] [2.7] [1.1] [1.4] [2.1] [1.2] [2.0]
Years in  0.11 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.10
Inventory [0.47] [0.47] [0.16] [0.62] [0.43] [0.29] [0.49]
Condition index 27.1 28.2 29.0 26.7 27.8 28.7 27.6
[3.4] [3.4] [2.9] [3.7] [3.1] [3.1] [3.4]
Condition 
reported as:  
Excellent (%) 0.9 2.5 5.2 0.30 1.7 4.8 1.6
Very good 8.5 18.7 21.5 7.6 14.6 18.0 13.0
Good 61.0 57.0 57.4 50.9 53.3 54.8 55.1
Fair 10.8 6.6 1.7 13.7 6.3 1.7 8.6
Poor 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3
Unknown 18.5 18.7 21.5 27.0 24.0 20.5 21.5
Notes:    Standard  Deviation  in  brackets.    The  full  sample  corresponds  to  model  years  1984  through  2000  for 
transactions occurring between January 1994 and September 2002.  42
Table 2:  Effect of the Labor Dispute on Appraisals; 
Dependent Variable:  Monetized Condition Index
Explanatory Variables






US × Dispute -0.21 -0.59 -0.54 -0.66 -0.76 -0.53
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Produced in the US 0.16 0.29 0.23 0.05 0.35 0.22
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)







Production-line age 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Years in inventory 0.13 0.13 0.31 0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
ln(   at )
^
0.02 0.04 0.11 -0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Model effects {353} Yes
Auction year dummies {9} Yes
Cohort effects {2,366} Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
US × production year trend Yes
Region and season controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of the  27.6 27.7 27.7 27.7 28.2 27.6
Dependent variable [3.4] [3.5] [3.5] [3.5] [3.3] [3.5]
Observations 42,841 17,153 17,153 17,153 9,664 15,847
R
2 0.17 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Notes:  Standard errors clustered on production-line are in parentheses.   Standard deviations are in brackets.  Number of 
categories in a group is in braces.  The dependent variable is the monetized condition index.   The full sample corresponds to 
pieces of equipment from model years 1984 through 2000 for transactions occurring between January 1994 and September 2002.  
Models with cohort-effects use the sub-sample of models that have both US and foreign production.  The dispute period is defined 
as the years spanning 1991 through 1997.  When pieces of equipment appear multiple times in the sample, only the first 
transaction is used.  All models include a constant.  Region and season controls consist of seven region dummies andmonth of 
auction dummies.  See text for further details on the controls.    
^ Selectivity adjustment43
Table 3:  Effect of the Labor Dispute on Appraisals; Ordered probit model
Log odds 











US × Dispute -0.12 0.033 1.62 0.83 -2.29 -0.19
(0.05) (0.016) (0.68) (0.25) (0.087) (0.07)
Relative frequency (%) 0.07 6.9 79.4 13.1 0.62
Notes:  Standard  errors  clustered  on  production-line  are  in  parentheses.  Standard  deviations  are  in  brackets.    The  model  is 
estimated with a US production dummy, a dummy for whether equipment was produced during the dispute, quadratic polynomial 
in equipment age, twenty equipment class dummies, auction year dummies, time in inventory, and production-line age.  There are 
33,615 observations in the sample.  Records with unknown condition ratings are excluded.  The pseudo-R
2 is 0.16.44
Table 4: Effect of the Labor Dispute on the US-Foreign Resale Price Differential; 
Dependent Variable: Log Resale Transaction Price
Explanatory Variables







US × Dispute 0.011 -0.044 -0.040 -0.054 -0.061 -0.035 -0.035
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.030) (0.013) (0.011)
Produced in the US 0.025 0.059 0.039 0.020 0.058 0.035 0.037
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.034) (0.012) (0.013)





2 (estimate ×100) 0.287
(0.030)
Production-line age -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Years in inventory 0.036 0.036 0.047 0.035 0.035
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
ln(   at )
^
-0.014 -0.011 -0.007 -0.014 -0.014
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Model effects {353} Yes
Auction year dummies {9} Yes
Cohort effects {2,366} Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
US × production year trend Yes
Condition dummies Yes
Region and season controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dependent Variable 10.77 10.96 10.96 10.96 10.97 10.96 10.96
[0.71] [0.64] [0.64] [0.64] [0.70] [0.63] [0.64]
Observations 42,841 17,153 17,153 17,153 9,664 15,847 17,153
R
2 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.90 0.91
Notes:  Standard errors clustered on production-line are in parentheses.   Standard deviations are in brackets.  Number of 
categories in a group is in braces.  The dependent variable is the log of the transaction price for the used equipment in 2000 
dollars.   See note to Table 2 for description of sample and controls.  
^ Selectivity adjustment45
Table 5: Effect of the Labor Dispute on the US-Foreign Resale Price Differential by Type of Engine










Produced in the US 0.038 0.023
(0.014) (0.02)





Notes:  Standard errors clustered on production-line are in parentheses.  Standard deviations in brackets.  The dependent variable 
is the log of the transaction price for the used equipment in 2000 dollars.   Both models include cohort fixed-effects, region 
dummies, month of auction dummies, years in inventory, a selectivity adjustment, and age of production-line at the time of 
production.  See Table 2 notes for description of sample and controls.    46
Table 6:  Effect of the labor dispute on the resale rate of construction equipment; Poisson models; dependent 








Log of the total number of 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
equipment transacted in the cell (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
US × Dispute 0.19 0.15 0.26 0.22 0.24
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.29) (0.13)
US -0.44 -0.35 -0.38 -0.29 -0.41
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.26) (0.13)
Model fixed- No No Yes Yes Yes
Effects {245}
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dependant  0.33 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.36
Variable  [0.79] [0.79] [0.81] [0.87] [0.83]
Observations 8,527 8,527 8,110 4,157 7,339
Log Likelihood -5,092 -5,001 -4,289 -2,175 -3,998
Notes:  The dependant variable is the number of pieces of equipment observed more than once in a production-line  production 
year  region cell, conditional on the equipment appearing at least once in US markets.  Models with fixed-effects are estimated 
using a conditional fixed-effects Poisson model.  All models include year of production dummies, census region dummies, and a 
constant.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard deviations are in brackets.  Number of categories in a group in
braces.  The full sample corresponds to equipment model years 1984 through 2000 for transactions occurring between January 
1994 and September 2002.  Equipment that was ever sold outside the US, and equipment held by Caterpillar for more than one 
year in inventory is excluded from the analysis.  47
Table 8: Effect of the Labor Dispute on the Market for New Equipment
Dependent Variable:  Log of the List Price of Model Classes
Explanatory
Variables (1) (2)
Fraction of equipment 0.018
Produced in the US (0.008)
Fraction of equipment -0.013
Produced in the US × Dispute (0.006)
Equipment Produced Exclusively  -0.018
In the US × Dispute (0.007)





Notes:  Standard errors clustered on model in parentheses.   Standard deviations in brackets.  Both models are estimated with 
model and year fixed effects.   There are 180 models included in the first specification and 162 in the second.    48
Appendix Table 1
Values of the Monetized Condition Index
Condition reported as: Index
Standard error of the
estimated value
Excellent 36.3 3.4
Very Good 32.5 3.4
Good 27.8 3.4
No condition reported 26.8 3.4
Fair 20.0 3.4
Poor 0
Notes: These are the values of the monetized condition index which are estimated using 
the procedure described in Appendix B.   The R-squared from the regression used to estimate 
the index is 0.93.   